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a b s t r a c t
The adoption of open architecture has several economic implications in the life of an asset, including
developmental, production, storage, training and maintenance costs. This research responds to an
inquiry by the Program Executive Officer—Integrated Weapons System (US Department of the Navy)
regarding the value of open architecture (OA) in the design of complex assets. With this intent, we
evaluate how the inventory allocation of spare engines for the F-16 operations in the continental United
States would be affected with and without the adoption of open architecture, focusing on the benefits of
inventory pooling to meet the demand of many users from a small number of storage sites. We use a
distance-constrained version of the Ardalan heuristic for solving the facility location problem,
responding to practical limitations exposed by the model. This article shows that open architecture
may provide substantial supply chain cost reduction, and simplification of the distribution network
when combined with proper inventory storage policies.
Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
The combined use of commonality and modularity in product
design has allowed automobiles, aircraft, computers and a host of
other machines (including most military systems) to be reusable
beyond their first lifecycle and to be given many more years of
operation. This versatility substantially impacts the availability
and maintenance cost of many durable assets. Modularity enables
the division of the product development effort among many
specialists (firms or individuals), ensuring the development of the
most advanced and competitive systems. Modularity facilitates
the separation of component-wear phenomena as the system
ages, enabling maintenance professionals to locate and repair
damaged modules without affecting the integrity of other
modules in the system.
Commonality, however, presents a disadvantage that many
engineers will recognize: the adoption of common design in a
competitive environment hinders creativity and innovation in
product development; suppliers of high-technology products
would prefer to develop their own designs than to share them
with competitors. The design team would rather showcase its
capabilities, especially in the development of advanced systems or
in the adoption of new technologies. Hence, while modularity
remains a powerful product-development philosophy that brings
agility and cost reduction to product design, the adoption of
common designs for complex products may be not the best
approach to system acquisition—especially in circumstances
requiring the development of advanced technologies. In these
scenarios, the traditional ‘‘commonality’’ must be enhanced with
the adoption of ‘‘open architecture’’ features—allowing modules
from competing sources to be used in the same system, without
constraining the creativity and innovation from the designers
involved in the development of the module.
Open architecture provides the opportunity to introduce
product aggregation, one of the three aggregation (or pooling)
approaches to managing and improving supply-chain perfor-
mance, along with time aggregation and place aggregation.
Product aggregation is intended to reduce product variety without
compromising the functionality required by the user.
The purpose of this case study is to evaluate open architecture
as the design philosophy for the acquisition of complex systems
with advanced technologies. This is done by analyzing the case of
the F-16 spare engines, showcasing the cost benefits that the
US Air Force might be enjoying today had the aircraft engine
suppliers been required to adopt open architecture. This study
assumes that a complex system (such as the Joint Strike Fighter,
or other weapon systems acquired by the uniformed services of
the US Department of Defense) is a combination of hardware and
software components that may be acquired from multiple
developers or suppliers. This study proposes that the adoption
of open architecture in the acquisition of these systems can
substantially reduce the costs of these programs.
Next section describes the problem that motivated this study,
and Section 3 explains how open architecture affects product
development and life-cycle management. Section 4 describes
current inventory management policy and allocation of F-16 spare
engines at Air Force bases in the contiguous United States. Section
5 introduces a brief literature review of the methodology used to
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rationalize F-16 spare engine allocation. Section 6 analyzes the
case under three scenarios: the benchmark scenario, which is
based on current policy, a scenario with limited inventory
pooling, and a third scenario with open architecture of engine
design. Section 7 presents the conclusions and suggestions for
future research.
2. Motivation: F-16 alternative engines
Modularity facilitates the development of new systems using
modules that were previously designed and developed for other
systems, providing major time and cost savings product develop-
ment initiative that can exploit these benefits. Moreover, because
of commonality, high-value modules in a system may be
recovered at the end of the system’s life and used in another
product—a process often called cannibalization. In the case of
complex models with high engineering content, such as aircraft
turbines, it may be desirable to have multiple suppliers offering
competing designs, which could be accomplished with the
adoption of open architecture. The Defense Acquisition University
(2006) defines open architecture as follows:
The confluence of business and technical practices yielding
modular, interoperable systems that adhere to open standards
with published interfaces. This approach significantly in-
creases opportunities for innovation and competition, enables
reuse of components, facilitates rapid technology insertion,
and reduces maintenance constraints.
Modularity and commonality are the two aspects in product
design that support the adoption of an open architecture. They
facilitate the execution of an agile product development program
with a wide-reaching product line that meets the requirements of
multiple users with different needs. The renewed emphasis on
open architecture allows strategic resource allocation, facilitating
the acquisition of better assets with lower costs. A current
example of this design approach is the F-35 Lightning II,
Joint Strike Fighter, a multi-role aircraft currently in production
for the uniformed services of the US Department of Defense (DoD)
and for many of the US allies. The Federation of American
Scientists (2005a) indicates that among its strengths, ‘‘JSF y
will capitalize on commonality and modularity to maximize
affordability.’’
In practice, previous developments and acquisitions of weapon
systems by the DoD usually did not have this focus. For instance,
Pratt & Whitney (P&W) and General Electric Aircraft Engines
(GEAE) produce engines for the F-16 aircraft used by the US Air
Force and a few foreign military forces. The P&W F100-PW-200
aircraft engine was originally selected over GEAEs as the sole
source engine for the F-16. The original F-16 was designed as a
lightweight, air-to-air day-fighter. Air-to-ground responsibilities
transformed the first production F-16s into multi-role fighters.
The first operational F-16A was delivered in January 1979 to the
388th Tactical Fighter Wing at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. The
delivery of 2200+ aircraft to the US Air Force continued until
March 2001 (Federation of American Scientists, 2005b).
The decision to choose an alternate fighter engine for the F-16
led to the development of the General Electric Aviation Engine’s
F110 series. With the implementation of the Alternative Fighter
Engine competition for the F-16 in 1985, GEAE fielded the F110-
GE-100 version to compete with Pratt & Whitney’s F100-PW-220
engine. Throughout the production of the F-16, the performance
requirements for both suppliers were identical, but the engines
delivered were not interchangeable. In fact, the airframe manu-
facturer, Lockheed-Martin, had to deliver structurally different
frames to use the different engines. For example, aircraft with
production numbers ending in zero are designed and built with
significantly larger air intake to accept the GEAE F110 series
engine. Aircraft with production numbers ending in two are
designed and built with smaller air intake to use the P&W F100
series engine. Each engine type (GEAE or P&W) uses different
control software (with implications in the cockpit controls and
pilot training), requiring unique airframe interface. With the
exception of the engine, the airframe interface and the control
software, aircraft of the same generation would otherwise be
identical.
The adoption of two engine suppliers for the F-16 fighter
aircraft was intended to eliminate the monopoly held by Pratt &
Whitney as the sole-source engine supplier for that aircraft.
However, allowing the newcomer (GEAE) to design a product
that was not interchangeable with the existing engine did
not eliminate some of the monopoly effects in the long-term,
and created costly logistics constraints.
Similar to the F-16 acquisition experience in the 1980s and
the 1990s, the ongoing acquisition process of the Joint Strike
Fighter includes the development of two competing power plants:
the Pratt & Whitney F135, and the GEAE F136, developed in
partnership with Rolls-Royce. On its website, the Federation of
American Scientists states that the F-35 propulsion systems will
be ‘‘physically and functionally interchangeable in both the
aircraft and support systems.’’ According to the Joint Strike
Fighter Program Office, ‘‘the F135 and F136 teams are working
closely to develop common propulsion system components’’ (F-35
JSF Program, 2007).
In this study, we analyze current usage data of P&W and GEAE
spare engines held in various bases in the continental United
States to support the F-16 operations to identify substantial cost
reduction from the pooling effects that could be achieved with the
use of better inventory allocation (place aggregation), as well as
the adoption of open architecture (product aggregation). One
important caveat exists, however: considering the limited amount
of usable data available about the acquisition and use of these
aircraft, the reader is cautioned that this analysis is not a critique
of the acquisition of the F-16 aircraft or its engines. Rather, it
intends to discuss how it would have benefited had it adopted
open architecture.
3. Open architecture as a design approach to simplify the
supply chain
This section presents open architecture and how it generally
benefits product design. The concept stems from the development
approach used by many software houses, in which sub-routines
(modules) are developed by individual designers having only two
major constraints: the functionality (i.e., the sub-routine does
what is expected to do) and the standardized interface with the
main program (i.e., the sub-routine has seamless integration with
other modules in the software).
Nelson (2007) indicates that open architecture principles have
been around since at least 1981, when IBM developed its personal
computer. The design of the IBM-PC was a major breakthrough in
that it was made of a set of physical modules that could be
replaced by similar modules of different design, make or
performance, as long as they satisfied a limited set of interface
requirements and fulfilled the expected functions. For example, a
hard disk drive of a given capacity and make could be upgraded
by another hard disk of different make and greater capacity, as
long as it satisfied a simple set of interface constraints. By
contrast, one is not usually able to replace the engine of an
automobile by one from a different maker, even if the two have
similar performance, size or functionality.
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The open architecture design philosophy was extremely
successful for desktop computers, and it still describes most
desktop computers built almost 30 years later. In contrast,
proprietary designs have lead to expensive and less successful
products in the computer industry—such as the computer Amiga
that preceded the IBM-PC, the short-lived Unix desktop, and
various generations of the Macintosh desktop. With the exception
of the IBM-PC, the adoption of open architecture in computer
hardware design is limited. Space and weight limitations have
restricted the use of open architecture in the design of laptop
computers. Hence, internal components developed for one
particular laptop usually cannot be used in a different model
or brand. Open architecture benefits have been usually restricted
to the interfaces with external accessories and, in some cases, to
memory units.
It is important not to confuse open architecture with ‘‘open
source’’ (Coar, 2006). Software developed under an open source
philosophy is copyright-free and can be modified and extended by
any other software writer, as exemplified by the Linux operating
system and the Mozilla web browser. Nonetheless, to enable
continued expansion, open source software usually adopts open
architecture as the means to ensure a compatible interface
between the works of multiple authors.
In 2006, the US Navy released the Open Architecture Contract
Notebook, explicating the open architecture guidelines to be
adopted by Acquisition Officers (PEO-IWS, 2006). Specifically, it is
recommended that contracts include this statement: ‘‘The Con-
tractor will be required to define, document, and follow an open
systems approach for using modular design, standards-based
interfaces, and widely supported consensus-based standards’’
(p. 7). While these recommendations usually target software
design, they can be quite useful in the design and acquisition of all
complex hardware. The adoption of open architecture principles
in hardware design provide some of the same benefits found in
software design, in addition to the following:
1 Simplified maintenance: the modularity found in open
architecture products makes it easier to remove, replace and
repair damaged modules with minimal impact to the whole
system.
2 Simplified logistics: open architecture enables the use of
modules by different makes, or even different generations, if
they maintain the same interface standards.
3 Reduced acquisition cost: open architecture allows a true
competition between potential suppliers in all phases of the
lifecycle of the product, requiring just that each potential
supplier adopt the standard module interfaces.
These benefits become more critical when we realize that
many complex assets depend on the successful integration of
multiple hardware and software modules. The determination of
standard interfaces between modules allows substantial savings
in the operation and maintenance of weapon systems, as
illustrated by the F-16 aircraft engine. In some cases, an engine
or engine components (modules) may be removed and trans-
ported to Tinker Air Force Base (AFB), the maintenance depot for
F-16 engines, without any maintenance action by local techni-
cians. In other cases, local technicians may be capable of
performing the required maintenance action locally and returning
the engine to operable or Ready for Issue (RFI) status.
The managers of active duty air force bases aggressively track
the status of engine changes. They expect turnaround of less than
24 hours from each engine change operation, which requires
keeping a certain inventory of spare engines readily available.
This culture seems to contrast with Air National Guard (ANG) and
Air Force Reserve (AFR) units, in which the F-16 aircraft are used
less intensively. Guard and Reserve units typically have fewer
assigned aircraft and, therefore, have a lower spare engine stock.
However, given that their primary mission is the defense of the
national air space, they too can benefit from having a short engine
maintenance turnaround.
The US Air Force uses the F-16 in 30 bases of various sizes,
including Active Duty (AD), Air Force Reserve (AFR) and Air
National Guard (ANG). Each base has its own stock of spare
engines to meet demand. Some of the bases use aircraft with GE
engines; others use aircraft with P&W engines. As explained
earlier, bases do not use engines of different make in their fleets
because they are not interchangeable in any way. The most
notable differences associated with the two power plants are as
follows:
1 Airframes are structurally different, with a distinct engine bay
for each engine make.
2 Engines have different durability and reliability, leading to
distinct preventive maintenance needs.
3 Repair parts, maintenance jigs and tools are different.
4 The software that controls engine performance and interprets
the pilot’s command from the cockpit is different.
5 Aircraft using different engines respond differently to the
pilot’s commands. This mandates a non-trivial period of
adaptation when a pilot switches from one aircraft type to
the other.
In short, because of different design choices made by the
engine manufacturers, we have effectively two distinct aircraft
types in service under the codename F-16. This creates undesir-
able limitations in the way aircraft and engines are used and
maintained. The open architecture design approach would
effectively eliminate many of the differences between the two
engines, without constraining the creativity and flexibility of the
design engineer.
4. Case description: F-16 spare engine storage
This section describes the inventory management of the F-16
spare engines, as practiced by US Air Force bases using this
aircraft. The expected demand for spare engines was 656 P&W
engines and 773 GEAE engines in 2008, reflecting a negative trend
of approximately 5.8% per year since 2001. Demand originates in
13 bases using Pratt & Whitney-powered aircraft, and 18 bases
using General Electric-powered aircraft in the Continental United
States. In general, these bases hold a total pre-positioned
inventory of 159 spare engines, turning the inventory fewer than
9 times per year. Table 1 shows the historic demand in each base,
next to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) code
of the respective airfield. Based on a simple linear regression of
the 8-year demand in each of the 31 bases, the forecasted demand
for year 2008 is also shown in the table. As we can observe,
approximately half of the forecasted demand is fragmented across
24 Air National Guard (ANG) bases, and the remainder is
distributed in four Active Duty (AD) bases; a small demand is
generated in two Air Force Reserve (AFR) bases. Each base has
different capabilities to provide engine maintenance, with all the
complexity that such maintenance entails. In general, the ADs
have the support personnel and equipment to give some service,
while the ANGs and AFRs have limited maintenance
infrastructure. Notice that four ANG bases are co-located with
AD bases (Andrews AFB (DC), Kelly AFB (NM), Buckley AFB (CO)
and Kirtland AFB (NM)), where valuable synergies regarding
engine maintenance can be expected.
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To prevent shortage, which would affect the readiness of the
respective base, a base-stock inventory management policy is
adopted such that a prescribed level of inventory is kept at each
based. The Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, located at Tinker
AFB, provides ‘‘supply chain management, including acquisition,
repair, storage, distribution, disposal and the technical and
engineering services for the center’s assigned engines,’’ which
include major maintenance activities for the F100 and F110
engines (Tinker AFB, 2007). This depot is conveniently located in
the center of the country, but only seven bases are within 1-day
driving range (approximately 550 miles)—an important consid-
eration since managers expect to maintain the base stock at all
times. Traveling time to other bases is as long as 3 days. Hence,
the lead time for an order placed from each base is typically
between 5 and 7 business days, depending on the distance to the
customer and provided that Tinker has the engine in stock ready
for issue.
The US Air Force propulsion requirements determine the spare
engine inventory level, adding a safety stock based on the demand
variability and on the service level associated with the user’s
priority. This service level depends on the primary assignment for
each location: either combat (80% service level), or training (70%
service level). All F-16 users in this study are considered combat
units—except those located at Luke AFB (AZ), a training base
(Henderson and Higer, 2007). The demand variability is caused by
two random variables that regulate the queuing system at the
Tinker AFB maintenance depot:
1 Number of hours flown per month: this drives the actual
demand seen at the depot.
2 Maintenance service time: this drives the waiting time until an
engine can be serviced.
The asset utilization randomness drives the need for a safety
stock. Considering the forecasted demand for 2008, and the unit
prices of $3.27M (P&W) and $2.95M (GEAE), the recommended
safety stock in all bases is worth $123.9M, as shown in Table 2.
This base stock policy meets the forecasted demand according to
the current practice of each base keeping its own inventory. The
difference between the base stock and the safety stock
(8640¼46) is the sum of the expected lead-time demand in
each site.
Table 1
Historic demand of F100 and F110 engines.
Sources: Historic data adapted from Henderson and Higer (2007) and http://www.f-16.net. Forecast by the author.
Pratt & Whitney (F100 engine)
Base ICAO ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 2008 forecast
Mean Std err
ANG-Burlington VT BTV 52 39 51 48 43 31 40 34.9 6.5
ANG-Duluth MN DLH 49 52 56 38 30 27 33 23.0 7.1
ANG-Des Moines IA DSM 40 37 32 28 12 25 13 8.9 5.7
ANG-Ellington TX EFD 38 53 42 38 39 33 37 33.4 5.7
ANG-Fresno CA FAT 57 35 41 45 36 34 55 41.4 10.3
ANG-Ft Smith AR FSM 34 33 27 36 39 29 5 17.1 10.2
ANG-Ft Wayne IN FWA 38 37 33 47 23 28 29 25.7 7.3
Hill AFB-Depot UT HIF 56 71 64 54 67 67 67 67.7 6.5
Nellis AFB NV LSV 88 57 92 90 97 66 60 69.9 17.7
Luke AFB AZ LUF 365 355 344 327 338 273 250 248.1 19.1
Tinker AFB OK TIK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0
ANG-Toledo OH TOL 44 35 24 24 13 18 7 1.3 4.4
ANG-Tulsa OK TUL 43 34 21 22 21 18 9 4.9 4.5
ANG-Tucson AZ TUS 209 160 176 153 126 102 107 80.1 14.1
General Electric (F110 engine)
Base ICAO ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 2008 forecast
Mean Std Err
ANG-Albuquerque NM ABQ 48 40 45 39 27 38 37 31.3 5.6
ANG-Eggharbor NJ ACY 44 53 51 53 38 20 22 19.4 9.5
ANG-Andrews DC ADW 33 39 26 21 34 29 26 25.0 6.0
ANG-Buckley CO BKF 40 33 48 39 33 28 29 27.4 6.0
Cannon AFB NM CVS 175 153 126 102 93 99 65 48.9 11.3
ANG-Sioux SD FSD 42 60 49 42 43 45 42 41.0 6.6
ANG-Gt Falls MT GTF 33 45 47 55 46 53 29 44.4 10.6
Hill AFB UT HIF 245 201 225 236 202 230 220 217.0 17.8
AFR-Homestead FL HST 40 31 41 32 34 26 33 28.4 4.7
ANG-Montgomery AL MGM 39 30 50 46 26 45 34 37.3 9.8
ANG-Madison WI MSN 45 33 33 33 28 25 36 26.4 5.6
ANG-Selfridge MI MTC 65 45 47 51 37 43 33 30.1 6.6
AFR-Ft Worth TX NFW 47 40 41 20 38 26 27 21.1 7.5
ANG-Richmond VA RIC 36 42 37 36 20 25 6 8.7 7.0
ANG-Springfield OH SGH 53 64 63 57 43 54 56 51.3 7.2
ANG-Kelly TX SKF 61 49 46 56 50 49 46 45.1 5.0
ANG-Springfield IL SPI 33 19 24 27 23 31 34 31.0 5.7
ANG-Syracuse NY SYR 0 0 31 38 35 33 39 38.5 3.3
Tinker AFB OK TIK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 0.0
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5. Warehouse location and related literature
As discussed in the previous section, the USAF currently
manages the inventory of spare engines without taking advantage
of any pooling benefit. An alternative approach would be to hold
the inventory in select bases within acceptable distance. The
selection of sites that should hold inventory is characterized as
the p-median problem; this section presents some of its early
literature.
The p-median problem can be described as a process for
identifying p facilities to serve customers in n nodes of a network
(pon). Finding a limited number of Air Force bases to store spare
engines for all bases in the Continental United States would
be a p-median problem with special characteristics, which we
describe later. The heuristics to solve the p-median problem
usually strive to find the minimum transportation time, given the
respective demands. As Reese (2005) described in his bibliogra-
phy, there are four primary approaches to the facility location
problem, and the p-median is one of them, along with the p-center,
the incapacitated facility location and the quadratic assignment
problems. The p-median problem is a location–allocation problem,
because it finds the supply nodes and allocates the customers that
should be served by each of them.
The unconstrained p-median problem seems to have been
first described by Hakimi (1965). Toregas et al. (1971) formulated
the constrained problem as a mixed integer program, and
many researchers have attempted to solve both the constrained
and unconstrained problems using either approximate heuristics,
or exact branch-and-bound, or Lagrangean relaxation algorithms.
A large number of heuristics were developed to solve specific
variations of the problem; we focus on four of them.
Kuehn and Hamburger (1963) proposed a greedy heuristics
and tested it using a simple data set that became standard to test
other solutions. This was later described as an add heuristics,
because it assigns facilities to locations successively, as they
improve market coverage and reduce transportation cost. Teitz
and Bart (1968) proposed a replacement heuristics: from an
initial arbitrary allocation of p facilities, the remaining locations
are successively tested as replacements for elements in the
original set if they improve performance, or they are disregarded
if they don’t. This heuristics does not have distance constraint
capability; rather, the manager has to find the solution with
increasing number of nodes until all facilities are served from a
node within the distance constraint. Khumawala (1972) proposed
two greedy heuristics that he called ‘‘delta’’ and ‘‘omega’’, both of
them incorporating distance constraints. Delta is an elimination
heuristics that starts with the whole pool of locations, and
gradually eliminates, one at a time, those that cost the least to
shut down, until none can be eliminated without violating the
distance constraint. Omega is an add heuristic that gradually
selects from the pool of locations, one at a time, those that provide
greatest cost reduction, considering the facilities already open.
Facilities are added until the constraint is met for all customers.
For reviews, see Vidal and Goetschalckx (1997), Beamon (1998),
Erenguc et al. (1999), Sarmiento and Nagi (1999), Reese (2005)
and Nagy and Salhi (2007).
Ardalan (1988) compared the performance of the Kuehn
and Hamburger (1963) heuristics with the ones originally
proposed by Khumawala, also considered efficient and simple to
implement. They were compared against the optimal solution
under several location–allocation scenarios, with customer loca-
tions varying from 10 to 40 nodes from which 3 or 4 supply
sources would be allocated using either heuristics; a total of 14
different scenarios. Each problem was replicated 50 times with
each heuristics. Ardalan found that the proposed heuristics
performed better than Khumawala’s in almost every situation
examined, except in one case, the selection of 4 supply nodes from
10 customer locations. Given the impact of this study, the Kuehn-
Hamburger heuristics has since been known as the Ardalan
heuristics, being included in several operations management
textbooks.
Rahman and Smith (1991) and Chaudhry et al. (1995)
compared Teitz and Bart (1968) and the Ardalan (1988) heuristics,
with and without maximum distance constraints, using a variety
of data sets. Although Ardalan generally provided worse solutions
than Teitz-Bart, it should be noted that Teitz-Bart had to be
applied several times with different random seeds before the best
objective value was eventually found. Summarizing the compara-
tive studies, we have the following:
 Ardalan’s heuristics is superior to Teitz-Bart’s in problems with
fewer customers and distance constraints.
 Ardalan’s is more powerful than Khumawala’s in problems
with 10–40 customers and 3 or 4 nodes, except when more
nodes are desired for fewer customers.
 Teitz-Bart’s is generally superior to Ardalan’s in problems with
30–75 customers without distance constraint.
These comparisons are not enough to indicate that any
particular heuristic is the best. Since Teitz-Bart’s is cumbersome
for treating problems with distance constraints, the most
appropriate selection in these cases should be one of Khumawala’s
heuristics or Ardalan’s heuristic.
6. Analysis: three approaches to spare engines storage
The following section presents a centralized storage solution
for the spare engine inventory problem, a lower bound that
ignores distance and time constraints. Then it uses the Ardalan
heuristic to select the bases that should hold the inventory of each
engine type separately, or both engine types together. We select
Ardalan’s method for two reasons: it is the easiest to incorporate
distance constraint using MS Excel, and it is better than
Khumawala’s in problems with lower customer-to-node ratio.
All approaches in this section meet an 85% service level in all
bases at a lower cost than what is currently practiced by the Air
Force.
6.1. Centralized storage
It is a well-known statistical fact that when two independent
random variables are added, the resulting variable is proportion-
ally less variable, provided that the variables are not correlated.
Recent demand data for the F-16 replacement engines (Table 1)
show that the changes in demand in the bases do not follow any
particular pattern that would suggest a correlation. Demand
increased in some bases, decreased in others, and oscillated
randomly in most of them. A direct verification of the two-way
correlation between the 30 bases shows that most of them fit in
Table 2
Inventory distribution according to category and make
Inventory status: each base stores its own replacement engines
P&W GEAE Total
Annual demand 656 773 1429
Base stock 38 48 86
Safety stock 18 22 40
Safety stock value $58.9 $65.0 $123.9
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the range from 0.2 to +0.5. For all we know, the variations in
demand were not driven by a common policy that affected all
bases in the same way each year. Rather, local policies affected the
changes separately and thus, there is prior expectation that the
coefficient of variation of the joint demand of multiple bases is
lower than the coefficient of variation of the demand in individual
bases. Hence, to manage the demand variability of two or more
bases, it is possible to hold lower aggregate inventory in a single
facility than it is to hold each inventory separately.
This simple observation has powerful applications that are often
ignored. For instance, Tinker AFB does not have any assigned F-16
aircraft. However, considering its status as the maintenance depot
and its central location, it is conceivable to store all F-16 engines at
the depot, regardless of make, and ship them directly to the
respective base when needed. Pooling this demand under a single
inventory would reduce the safety stock, generating substantial
savings. Under this policy, the total inventory of Pratt & Whitney
engines necessary to satisfy demand (with the same degree of
confidence in satisfying the demand in each base) would drop from
38 (see Table 2) engines to 18 engines, as shown in Table 3.
Likewise, GEAE engine inventory would drop from 48 to 20. These
inventory reductions would be credited exclusively to the pooling
effect; in other words, to achieve the same service level, a
centralized (or pooled) inventory requires a smaller safety stock
than a distributed (or pre-positioned) inventory. In addition to
adopting a centralized inventory, if the engines were designed
using an open architecture, we would be able to reduce the
inventory further, from 38 to 35 engines. The safety stock would
reduce by 30%, from 10 to 7 units. Open architecture would require
that P&W and GEAE engines could be used interchangeably in any
airframe.
There are a few weaknesses associated with central storage
solution. Considering that it is necessary to ensure that the drive
time to receive the engine when ordered from the field is less than
1 day, inventory consolidation at only one central location might
not meet the operational needs: it would impose up to a 3-day
traveling time between the inventory and some users, compro-
mising their readiness. However, according to users in the field,
one business day (550 miles driving distance or less) is an
acceptable traveling time for a replacement engine.
Proponents of pre-positioning will point to availability (or
readiness) as one of its greatest benefits. However, just as the
centralization of the inventory in a single location is inefficient,
pre-positioning is costly and may expose the user to potentially
lower inventory availability (due to increased demand variability)
unless there is an additional investment in safety stock. The
following section shows an alternative approach that does not
centralize the inventory in a single location, but in a few selected
locations. The solution combines some of the advantages of pre-
positioned inventories with the risk-pooling benefits of an
aggregate storage plan.
6.2. Regional storage
Some of the risk pooling benefits can be observed through
regional inventory storage. We identify this as the p-median
problem. A word of caution: a transportation model based on a
mixed-integer programwould not be a useful approach to find the
storage points in this problem for two main reasons: (1) The
problem is fairly complex to be analyzed using software typically
available to most managers (MS Excel and Solver). (2) Most
important, if every customer is also a potential sourcing point, and
the number of storage points is pre-determined but not pre-
identified, the solution process would encounter discontinuities
in the objective function. This would prevent us from finding the
optimal solution, even for a small problem with just 13
customers.
The heuristics popularized by Ardalan (1988) requires the
development of a table of distances between potential inventory
locations and users, as well as the assignment of weights to help
prioritize the decisions. It is a greedy procedure that sequentially
identifies the locations that are closest to the most demanding
users until all warehouses are identified. In this problem, the table
of distances was created with Yahoo! Maps (http://maps.yahoo.
com). As recommended by the heuristic, an Ardalan table is
created as the product between the user’s demand (di), the table
of distances (xij) and a weight associated with that delivery (wj).
Because of existing resources at active duty bases, it is usually
more desirable to store engines there than at ANG or AFR.
Moreover, it is more desirable to store engines at Tinker AFB than
at any other AD base because it is the depot that provides major
maintenance support for the F-16 engines. Hence, this modified
Ardalan matrix assigns weights to the sources (wj) that act as a
‘‘source penalty,’’ rather than to customers, which would indicate
their priority levels. Since Tinker is the ideal source, its weight is
1. Other AD bases received a weight of 1.1, while the AFR and ANG
sites received a weight of 1.5. To create a distribution network for
k customers, this process generates a square matrix with k rows
and columns in which the value of each cell (aij) is determined by
the expression:
aij ¼ dixijwj
This matrix is the root of the procedure to identify a set of
storage locations that require low transportation time to the
respective users and provide the benefit of inventory aggregation.
The following steps identify an efficient set of storage locations:
Step 1: Let s¼1. This variable is the number of storage points at
the end of this round.
Step 2: Generate the value Aj ¼
P
iaij, the weighted sum of all
shipments from storage point j to each customer i.
Step 3: Identify Am¼Min{A1,y, Aks+1}. Column m defines the
least onerous storage location in round s.
Step 4: Move column m to the end of the matrix.
Step 5: For each cell (i,j) that satisfies jrks, let
aij¼Min{aij,amj}.
Step 6: If a stopping point is reached, stop. Otherwise, let
s¼s+1 and repeat steps 2–5.
The stopping point could be, for instance, a pre-established
number of storage facilities or some capacity limitation. In this
case, since this is a distance-constrained problem, we added
storage points until all users were served by inventories within a
Table 3
Central storage of spare engines at Tinker AFB.
Inventory status: all replacement engines stored at Tinker AFB
P&W GEAE Total
Annual demand 656 773 1429
Base stock 18 20 38
Safety stock 5 5 10
$ Safety stock $16.4 $14.8 $31.1
Inventory status: all replacement engines stored at Tinker AFB. OA allows
using engines of different makes in any F-16 airframe
All makes, common interface
Annual demand 1429
Base stock 35
Safety stock 7
$ Safety stock $21.71
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1-day drive (approximately a 550-mile distance). However, as any
heuristics, some exception may be necessary to ensure that it
finds a solution that is efficient (low cost) and effective (meets all
practical constraints). Consequently, we added another twist:
each low-cost location found with the heuristic is selected as a
new storage point only if it increases the network coverage, i.e.,
one or both conditions are satisfied: (1) the low-cost location
is not within range from any of the existing storage locations or
(2) the low-cost location is within range from a customer that
cannot be served by any of the existing storage locations. If these
conditions are not satisfied, that low-cost location is not
contributing with the inventory-pooling objective, and the next
low-cost location is selected in its place.
The heuristics is illustrated with the allocation of the Pratt &
Whitney spare engines, in Table 4. All 13 customers are served
from 6 locations, shown in Fig. 1. Nellis AFB (LSV), located within
a 1-day drive distance from two previously assigned storage
locations (LUF and HIF), does not improve network coverage, so it
is not selected in rounds 5 and 6. The next lower-cost location in
each round, DLH (ANG-Duluth in Minnesota) and FWA (ANG-Ft
Wayne in Indiana) are selected instead. Notice that despite the
inventory pooling efforts, three locations (Hill AFB-Depot in Utah,
ANG-Duluth and ANG-Burlington in Vermont) store inventory for
just their needs, because of their distance to other bases using the
same engine type.
Once the low cost storage locations are identified, each user i is
assigned to the storage location j that satisfies the equation
aij¼Min{ai,ks+1,ai,k}. Each storage location holds the inventory to
meet the demand for all users assigned to it, in addition to a safety
stock based on the aggregate demand variability in the bases
supplied by that location, and on the lead-time for that location to
resupply from the central depot in Tinker.
Locations holding inventory for multiple users benefit from the
pooling effect already discussed. For example, Luke AFB (LUF)
holds inventory for its needs and for three other bases. The
standard error of the forecasted annual demand (260 business
days) from each of these bases range between 10.3 and 19.1.
However, the standard error of the aggregate demand is just 31.4.
Considering a lead-time of 6 business days from TIK (the depot) to
LUF, the safety stock to meet the demand variability of all four
bases is just 4.9 units. Also, the aggregate expected demand from
the four users is 440 units per year (or 10.2 units during the lead-
time), which leads to a base stock of 16 (¼4.9+10.2) units.
Detailed information about the inventory allocations appears in
Table 5.
Using the heuristic to assign storage points for GEAE spare
engines, eight storage locations are sequentially identified
(Table 6). In this case, no exceptions are necessary, since every
allocation suggested by the heuristic expands the network
coverage—adding at least one base to within the 1-day delivery
threshold. In this analysis, eight bases are needed to hold the
inventory for 19 bases using GEAE engines (Fig. 2). Again,
two bases (AFR-Homestead FL and ANG-Montgomery AL) hold
Table 4
Heuristic application to the Pratt & Whitney spare engines allocation problem.
Lowest choice location is shown in parentheses, if different from selected site.
Heuristic
round
Lowest cost
location
Selected distribution
sites
Users within range
from all sites
s¼1 LUF LUF 4
s¼2 TIK LUF, TIK 8
s¼3 BTV LUF, TIK, BTV 9
s¼4 HIF LUF, TIK, BTV, HIF 10
s¼5 DLH (LSV) LUF, TIK, BTV, HIF,
DLH
11
s¼6 FWA (LSV) LUF, TIK, BTV, HIF,
DLH, FWA
13 (all)
Fig. 1. Regional storage of Pratt & Whitney spare engines. All maps: storage
locations identified as a star with base stock in parentheses. Users identified as a
circle. Typical roads are shown.
Table 5
Regional storage of Pratt & Whitney spare engines.
Source: The author.
Pratt & Whitney (F-100 engine)
Base ICAO 2008 forecast 2008 inventory Distance from inventory (mile)
Mean Base stock Safety stock
Luke AFB AZ LUF 248.1 16 4.9 0
ANG-Tucson AZ TUS 80.1 At LUF 145
Nellis AFB NV LSV 69.9 At LUF 278
ANG-Fresno CA FAT 41.4 At LUF 579
Tinker AFB OK TIK 0.0 3 1.8 0
ANG-Des Moines IA DSM 8.9 At TIK 545
ANG-Ft Smith AR FSM 17.1 At TIK 183
ANG-Ellington TX EFD 33.4 At TIK 467
ANG-Tulsa OK TUL 4.9 At TIK 119
ANG-Burlington VT BTV 34.9 3 1.1 0
Hill AFB-Depot UT HIF 67.7 3 1.1 0
ANG-Duluth MN DLH 23.0 2 1.1 0
ANG-Ft Wayne IN FWA 25.7 2 1.3 0
ANG-Toledo OH TOL 1.3 At FWA 98
Note: Storage locations in bold.
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inventory exclusively for their needs because of their distance to
other bases using the same engine. Table 7 shows storage points,
the size and the distance from each base to the respective
inventories.
As the analysis shows, regional storage reduces the safety
stock of P&W engines from 18 to 11 engines and the safety stock
of GEAE engines from 22 to 15 engines, in contrast to the fully
distributed storage of engines shown in Table 2. By pooling the
demand from each base into a limited number of storage points,
the coefficient of variation of the forecasted demand is reduced,
which leads to lower safety stock requirement and substantial
savings. This inventory allocation requires that two users
(ANG-Des Moines in Iowa and ANG-Great Falls in Montana) be
served by inventory located more than 500 miles away, but no
more than 600 miles from the user. Yet, this allocation allows all
bases to receive their spare engines within 1 day.
6.3. Regional storage with open architecture benefit
The regional storage performance could be substantially
improved if the engines were designed with an open architecture
mindset. Without OA, the inventory distribution in Figs. 1 and 2
benefits only from the regional pooling effect, observed when we
aggregate the demand for identical items from customers in close
proximity. In addition to the benefits associated with simpler
design and maintenance of these complex assets, the adoption of
open architecture would increase the number of bases in some
geographic regions that could be served by the same storage
Table 6
Heuristic application to the GEAE spare engines allocation problem.
Heuristic
round
Lowest cost
location
Selected distribution points Users within
range
s¼1 TIK TIK 4
s¼2 HIF TIK, HIF 6
s¼3 ADW TIK, HIF, ADW 12
s¼4 SGH TIK, HIF, ADW, SGH 14
s¼5 HST TIK, HIF, ADW, SGH, HST 15
s¼6 MGM TIK, HIF, ADW, SGH, HST, MGM 16
s¼7 CVS TIK, HIF, ADW, SGH, HST, MGM,
CVS
17
s¼8 FSD TIK, HIF, ADW, SGH, HST, MGM,
CVS, FSD
19 (all)
Table 7
Regional storage of General Electric spare engines.
Source: The author.
General Electric (F-110 engine)
Base ICAO 2008 forecast 2008 inventory Distance from inventory (mile)
Mean Base stock Safety stock
Tinker AFB OK TIK 0.0 3 1.2 0
ANG-Kelly TX SKF 45.1 At TIK 485
AFR-Ft Worth TX NFW 21.1 At TIK 211
Hill AFB UT HIF 217.0 11 3.5 0
ANG-Gt Falls MT GTF 44.4 At HIF 544
ANG-Andrews DC ADW 25.0 5 2.3 0
ANG-Eggharbo NJ ACY 19.4 At ADW 168
ANG-Syracuse NY SYR 38.5 At ADW 386
ANG-Richmond VA RIC 8.7 At ADW 122
ANG-Springfield OH SGH 51.3 5 1.8 0
ANG-Selfridge MI MTC 30.1 At SGH 253
ANG-Springfield IL SPI 31.0 At SGH 347
AFR-Homestead FL HST 28.4 2 0.8 0
ANG-Montgomery AL MGM 37.3 3 1.5 0
Cannon AFB NM CVS 48.9 5 2.0 0
ANG-Albuquerque NM ABQ 31.3 At CVS 220
ANG-Buckley CO BKF 27.4 At CVS 493
ANG-Sioux SD FSD 41.0 3 1.4 0
ANG-Madison WI MSN 26.4 At FSD 429
Note: Storage locations in bold.
Fig. 2. Regional storage of General Electric spare engines.
Table 8
Heuristic application to the complete spare engines allocation problem.
Heuristic
round
Lowest cost
location
Selected distribution
points
Users within
range
s¼1 ABQ ABQ 6
s¼2 ADW ABQ, ADW 15
s¼3 HIF ABQ, ADW, HIF 18
s¼4 LUF ABQ, ADW, HIF, LUF 19
s¼5 TIK ABQ, ADW, HIF, LUF, TIK 24
s¼6 FWA ABQ, ADW, HIF, LUF, TIK,
FWA
26
s¼7 FSD ABQ, ADW, HIF, LUF, TIK,
FWA, FSD
28
s¼8 HST ABQ, ADW, HIF, LUF, TIK,
FWA, FSD, HST
29
s¼9 MGM ABQ, ADW, HIF, LUF, TIK,
FWA, FSD, HST, MGM
30 (all)
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location, adding another dimension of supply-chain aggregation
to reduce the need for safety stock. This pooling effect created by
open architecture is called product aggregation: different products
that are perfect substitutes can be held as a single inventory pool.
This aggregation has the same pooling effect as when we pool
inventories from different locations.
The same heuristic used earlier to find separate inventory
storage can be used to find storage locations for spare engines
built using open architecture. The separate inventory allocation
required 6 bases for P&W engines and 8 bases for GEAE engines.
The joint allocation proceeds as shown in Table 8. In this
environment, engines from either manufacturer could be used
in any airframe. To meet the demand of all 30 bases from
locations within a 1-day drive, nine storage points suffice, shown
in Fig. 3. Among the selected storage points, there are three Active
Duty bases, one Air Force Reserve and five Air National Guard
sites. Notice that among the ANG bases, there are two that are co-
located with AD bases (ANG-Albuquerque in New Mexico and
ANG-Andrews in District of Columbia). These may enjoy some
support from this arrangement. Detailed information about the
inventory allocation is in Table 9.
Open architecture increases the population density of users
that can be served from the same overall inventory pool. In the
original allocation, there were 12 bases storing spare engines (two
of them storing both types), which amounted to 14 different
inventory pools. With this approach, only nine inventory pools
are necessary. Note that only two bases (ANG-Montgomery in
Alabama and AFR-Homestead in Florida) remain isolated, holding
just the engines required for their operation. This is quite an
improvement from the previous solution without OA, with five
isolated locations. Table 10 summarizes the performance of
regionalized storage with and without the benefit of open
architecture. Thanks to this added level of aggregation, the total
safety stock necessary to absorb the variability of demand in 30
bases is now just 21 units, contrasting quite favorably with the
safety stock of 40 engines in the distributed mode based on
current policy (Table 2).
As Fig. 3 shows, the use of open architecture greatly improves
the distribution network in the Northeast, Southwest, the Mid-
west and in the central part of the country, where four storage
locations (Tinker AFB, Luke AFB, Andrews AFB and ANG-Fort
Wayne) serve 20 bases. On the downside, three bases are served
by inventory located between 500 and 580 miles away, stressingFig. 3. Regional storage of spare engines with OA benefit.
Table 9
Regional storage of spare engines with OA benefit.
Source: The author.
Base ICAO 2008 forecast 2008 inventory Distance from inventory (mile)
Mean Base stock Safety stock
ANG-Albuquerque NM ABQ 31.3 5 2.2 0
Cannon AFB NM CVS 48.9 At ABQ 220
ANG-Buckley CO BKF 27.4 At ABQ 453
ANG-Andrews DC ADW 25.0 6 2.6 0
ANG-Richmond VA RIC 8.7 At ADW 122
ANG-Syracuse NY SYR 38.5 At ADW 386
ANG-Egg Harbor NJ ACY 19.4 At ADW 168
ANG-Burlington VT BTV 34.9 At ADW 523
Hill AFB UT HIF 284.7 12 2.9 0
ANG-Gt Falls MT GTF 44.4 At HIF 544
Luke AFB AZ LUF 248.1 16 4.9 0
ANG-Fresno CA FAT 41.4 At LUF 579
Nellis AFB NV LSV 69.9 At LUF 278
ANG-Tucson AZ TUS 80.1 At LUF 145
Tinker AFB OK TIK 0.0 4 2.0 0
ANG-Ellington TX EFD 33.4 At TIK 467
ANG-Ft Smith AR FSM 17.1 At TIK 183
AFR-Ft Worth TX NFW 21.1 At TIK 211
ANG-Kelly TX SKF 45.1 At TIK 485
ANG-Tulsa OK TUL 4.9 At TIK 119
ANG-Ft Wayne IN FWA 25.7 7 2.4 0
ANG-Madison WI MSN 26.4 At FWA 321
ANG-Selfridge MI MTC 30.1 At FWA 194
ANG-Springfield OH SGH 51.3 At FWA 141
ANG-Springfield IL SPI 31.0 At FWA 328
ANG-Toledo OH TOL 1.3 At FWA 98
ANG-Sioux SD FSD 41.0 4 1.8 0
ANG-Duluth MN DLH 23.0 At FSD 396
ANG-Des Moines IA DSM 8.9 At FSD 292
AFR-Homestead FL HST 28.4 2 0.8 0
ANG-Montgomery AL MGM 37.3 3 1.5 0
Note: Storage locations in bold.
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the operational constraint in this distribution process. However,
most users sit within a 1-day drive from one or more additional
storage points. Consequently, the safety stock necessary to
manage the demand variability of all 30 bases, which used to be
40 units in the original allocation (see Table 2), is now just 21
units. Considering that the average engine costs the DoD
approximately $3.1M, this reduction accounts as direct savings
of $58.8M—a savings due to the adoption of open architecture in a
regionalized inventory distribution.
6.4. Summary of results
The current distribution of spare engines for F-16s was used
to illustrate and evaluate the benefits of place and product
aggregation. Starting from the status quo, in which the inventory
is locally distributed in the hands of each user, and considering
that there are two engine makes (Pratt & Whitney and General
Electric) that are not interchangeable, we evaluated four alter-
native distribution models representing different aggregation
approaches: with or without open architecture (product aggrega-
tion) and centralized or regionalized distribution (place aggrega-
tion). As expected, both types of aggregations provided inventory
reduction. What perhaps was not expected was the dimension of
the safety stock reduction (Table 11).
One important concern is the impact on transportation costs.
To facilitate comparison, the analysis included a measure of
expected miles driven to each facility, considering that each
engine would generally be transported from the main depot to a
regional storage base, and then to the user. The baseline measure
of 1.41 million miles is the product between the number of units
shipped and the distance traveled. This total is the same, whether
the storage is centralized or distributed. Pooling the storage into
12 bases (without open architecture) would increase the distance
driven—and the transportation cost—to 1.51 million miles.
If the storage is pooled into just 9 bases (with open architecture),
the distance driven is increased to 1.55 million miles—10% more
than the baseline, to obtain a 47% safety stock reduction.
7. Conclusions and future research
An important concern in supply-chain management is the
identification of aggregation opportunities that exist in the
design, storage and distribution of goods to the final customer.
This aggregation, or pooling, can take place in three dimensions:
time aggregation, place aggregation and product aggregation. The
manager should evaluate the trade-offs in each of these aggrega-
tion opportunities in order to implement the correct product
design, storage and distribution procedures. Time aggregation
implies that the inventory is kept to meet the demand over longer
or shorter periods of time. Place aggregation implies that the
inventory is designed to meet the demand over one or many
markets. Finally, product aggregation implies that a product or
component is designed to meet the demand associated with one
or more applications. When any or all of these aggregations are
viable, the company enjoys substantial operational savings due to
the reduction of safety stock; in addition, much of the coordina-
tion effort may be reduced.
This paper analyzes the case of the F-16 spare engine storage
to illustrate two types of pooling benefits: by place and by
product. Here, product aggregation is achieved with the adoption
of open architecture in product design. Place aggregation is
achieved with judicious use of the classic Ardalan (1988)
heuristics subject to a distance constraint, necessary to ensure
the desired performance level. We draw several important lessons
from this study:
Open architecture is an effective means of product aggregation
to facilitate supply-chain improvement for valuable complex
assets.
Open architecture can be leveraged by place aggregation when
the asset is used by several facilities geographically distributed.
Open architecture provides the greatest inventory reduction
benefit when storage can be centralized. If centralization is not
desirable, it can still provide substantial benefits, by judicious
identification of a regional cluster of users to share joint
inventory.
Reduction in the number of storage points generally increases
transportation cost. Hence, it is important to evaluate the trade-
off between simplified infrastructure and reduced investment in
inventories against increases in transportation cost.
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the economic impact of
adopting open architecture in the design of complex assets to
reduce the lifecycle cost of maintaining those assets. The adoption
of open architecture affects several economic components in the
life of the asset, including developmental costs, maintenance
costs, and inventory-management costs. This article focuses on
the benefits of pooling the inventory necessary to meet the
demand of many users into a small number of storage sites with
product variety reduction obtained with open architecture.
Table 10
Regional storage of spare engines.
INVENTORY STATUS: replacement engines stored at a limited number of bases
P&W GEAE Total
Number of storage bases 6 8 12
Annual demand 656 773 1429
Base stock 29 37 66
Safety stock 11 15 26
Safety stock value $36.0M $44.3M $80.3M
Inventory status: replacement engines stored at a limited number of bases. OA
allows using engines of different makes in any F-16 airframe
All makes, common interface
Number of storage bases 9
Annual demand 1429
Base stock 59
Safety stock 21
Safety stock value $65.1M
Table 11
Performance of different aggregation approaches.
Product aggregation
Open architecture Proprietary design
Place aggregation
Central Storage points: 1 Storage points: 1
Safety stock: 7 Safety stock: 10
Safety stock value: $21.7M Safety stock value: $31.1M
Demand-miles: 1412 k Demand-miles: 141 2k
Regional Storage points: 9 Storage points: 12
Safety stock: 21 Safety stock: 26
Safety stock value: $65.1M Safety stock value: $80.3M
Demand-miles: 1.554 k Demand-miles: 1512 k
Local Storage points: 30 Storage points: 30
safety stock: 38 safety stock: 40
safety stock value: $117.2M safety stock value: $123.9M
demand-miles: 1412 k demand-miles: 1412 k
G. Ferrer / Int. J. Production Economics 128 (2010) 393–403402
The example showcased in this analysis—distribution of spare
engines for the F-16 in continental United States—amply supports
open architecture as the design approach to reduce supply chain
expenditures without compromising the availability of valuable
assets. The relevance here is far beyond the potential savings that
the F-16 program could have enjoyed, but is a lesson for future
government programs—whether they are weapon systems or
other assets supplied by two or more qualified suppliers. Several
examples come to mind, among them unmanned aerial vehicles,
the space program and high-speed rail equipment.
More than 40 years since Hakimi (1965) first formulated the
p-median problem, it is still necessary to warn managers in
government of the importance to use rigorous techniques to make
facility location decisions. Fok (2001) raised this issue, at the same
time that he recommended the use of accessible techniques, such
as the center of gravity method – for centralized storage – or the
Ardalan heuristics – for multi-facility storage, as is our case.
Future studies about the impact of open architecture on
complex systems should expand the analysis to incorporate
benefits provided by simplified maintenance, as well as to
investigate the additional cost and time required to coordinate
the developmental efforts to ensure a common interface. On the
distribution side, the regular adoption of transshipment (lateral
shipment) or the use of multiple storage units should be studied
as alternatives to improve inventory pooling, and thus to enhance
the value of open architecture in future product development
programs.
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